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Harbor Act 2s under which the defendants were being prosecuted.
In that case, defendants had a criminal action brought against them
for discharging waste materials into part of the waters of New York
Harbor. The court rejected defendents contention, stating that
the F.W.P.A. applies to pollution abatement and control, but does
not provide for criminal prosecution as does the New York
Harbor Act. Also, the F.W.P.A. specifically states that it "shall
not be construed as (1) superseding or limiting the function, under any other law .... of any other officer or agency of the
United States relating to water pollution."' Applying this reasoning to the Refuse Act, the courts would be compelled to find that
the F.W.P.A. does not supersede or supplant the Refuse Act, nor
can it be used to defeat the purposes of the Refuse Act.
D. Conclusion
The Refuse Act is a useful tool for the protection of water
resources endangered by pollution. The Act can be made sterile
by a limited definition of the term "tributary." With a liberal definition of this term the public may be offered an excellent source
of protection. It cannot be said that Congress has intended to
eliminate the Refuse Act by the establishment of a comprehensive
pollution program. On the contrary, Congress has supplemented
the Refuse Act by passage of the F.W.P.A. giving additional environmental protection to waterways. To limit the prosecutorial
power of the government under the Refuse Act by a limited definition of "tributary" would be to thwart Congress' legitimate purposes and intentions.
,David Jeffrey Millstone
28 33 U.S.C. § 441 (1970). This act deals exclusively with the dumping or
discharge of refuse into New York Harbor, Harbor of Hampton Roads and
Harbor of Baltimore.

93 U.S.C § 1174 (1970).

Evidence-Introduction of Insurance at a Trial
It remains a settled principle in West Virginia that "[t]he jury
should not in any manner be apprised of the fact that the de-

fendant is protected by indemnity insurance, and such action on
the part of plaintiff or his counsel will ordinarily constitute reversible error."1
'Wilkins

v. Schwartz, 101 W. Va. 37, 340, 182 S.F,. 887, 889 (1926).

See

generally Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761 (1949).
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Our law is replete with instances in which judgments render-

ed in trial courts have been reversed because of tacit violations of
this principle 2 This West Virginia view is in accord with the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions3
2E.g., Walters v. Appalachian Power Co., 75 W. Va. 676, 84 S.E. 617
(1915). Counsel for Walters called the defendant's attorney as a witness. The
witness was required to state that he was employed by an insurance company
and that the defendant had a policy with that company. The admission was
held reversible error. Adams v. Cline Ice Cream Co., 101 W. Va. 35, 36, 131 S.E.
867 (1926). Counsel for Adams, during voir dire examination of the jury,
stated to the court in the presence of the jury, "I have information to the
effect that the Cline Ice Cream Company carries insurance in the Standard
Accident Company. I would like to have the jury qualified as to whether any
member of this panel is a stockholder, officer, director, or employee of the
Standard Accident Company, if it is true that they carry casualty insurance
with that company." Adams v. Cline Ice Cream Co., supra at 56, 131 S.E. at
867. Held, reversible error. Wilkins v. Schwartz, 101 W. Va. 337, 840, 132
S.E. 887, 888 (1926). Plaintiff's counsel asked the defendant, "Have you or your
lawyer, or the insurance company, had doctors to examine this little girl in
the last few weeks?" This was reversible error even though the court instructed
the jury to disregard the reference to insurance. Fleming v. Hartrick, 105 W. Va.
135, 138, 141 S.E. 628, 629 (1928). Fleming's counsel cross-examined a defense witness in an effort to show that the witness expected to be compensated by an insurance representative for his services and expenses. The court, In
reversing a judgment for Fleming, said counsel's questioning established "a
deliberate and premediated purpose and design on the part of counsel to
appraise the jury of the fact that the defendant was protected by indemnity
insurance." Jones v. Smithson, 119 W. Va. 389, 193 S.E. 802 (1937). It was
not error for the trial court to refuse to allow the plaintiff to ask the veniremen, upon their voir dire, if they were interested in defendant's insurance
company. Lynch v. Alderton, 124 W. Va. 446, 450, 20 S.E.2d 657, 659 (1942). It
was reversible error to ask the whole jury panel, "Are any of you officers,
employees, agents or stockholders in any liability insurance company?" Bradfield v. Board of Educ. 128 W. Va. 228, 229, 36 S.E.2d 512, 513 (1945). "A
declaration in an action for wrongful death against a county Board of Education . . . which contains an allegation that such Board . . . carried insurance
* is demurrable." Flanagan v. Mott, 145 W. Va. 220, 229, 114 &E.2d 331, 337
(1960). Counsel for Flanagan in his closing argument stated, "What is it going
to take to teach this insurance company a lesson?" Held, reversible error. Graham v. Wriston, 146 W. Va. 484, 491, 120 S.E.2d 713, 719 (1961), Counsel for
Wriston implied that he was not insured. The court stated that "the fact that
such defendant does or does not carry insurance ... is immaterial, and is not a
proper subject of inquiry, either by the court or by counsel, at any stage of
the trial."
3 E.g., Sars, Inc. v. Nichols, 275 Ala. 17, 151 So. 2d 739 (1963); Ward v.
Bergschneider, 94 Ariz. 21, 381 P.2d 568 (1963); Strahan v. Webb, 231 Ark.
426, 330 S.W.2d 291 (1959); Crawford v. Alioto, 105 Cal. App. 2d 45, 233 P.2d
148 (1951); Douglas v. Galvin, 130 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1962); Lanier v. Lee, 111
Ga. 876, 143 S.E.2d 469 (1964); Bott v. Wendler, 203 Kan. 212, 453 P.2d 100
(1969); Sales v. Bradley, 356 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1962); Calver v. Lavigne, 160 Me.
414, 205 A.2d 159 (1964); Capiah Dairies Inc. v. Addkison, 247 Miss. 327, 153
So. 2d 689 (1963); Turner v. Caldwell, 349 S. 2d 493 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961p
Dalton v. Gesser, 72 N.J. Super. 100, 178 A.2d 64 (1962); Fincher v. Rhyne, 266
N.C. 64, 145 S.E.2d 316 (1965); Falkner v. Martin, 74 N.M. 159, 301 P.21 660
(1964); Walton v. Bennett, 376 P.2d 240 (Okla. 1962); Sherrick v. Landstrom,
229 Ore. 415, 367 P.2d 432 (1961); Patton v. Franc, 404 Pa. 306, 172 A.2d
297 (1961); Harrod v. Oiamciarulo, 95 R.I. 504, 188, A.2d 459 (1963); Crocker
v. Weathers 240 S.C. 412. 126 S.E.2d 335 (1962); Colwell v. Jones, 48 Tenn.
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Notwithstanding the general rule prohibiting introduction of
insurance into a trial, several West Virginia cases have recognized
certain well-defined exceptions to the rule. More particularly, it
was decided in Covington v. Navarre4 that the disclosure of indemnity insurance would not precipitate reversible error if it was
shown that examining counsel had neither solicited nor could
have anticipated the objectionable disclosure, provided that the
jury was properly instructed to disregard it. Similarly, in Ambrose
v. Young, 5 a witness's volunteered statement with regard to the
defendant's automobile insurance was determined not to be a basis
for reversal. 6 A substantial number of jurisdictions in the United States has adopted this exception.7 However, in Atkins v.
Bartlett,"the volunteered statements of the plaintiff, while testifying in his own behalf, mentioned that the defendant was insured.
This was held to justify reversal, especially since the trial court
had previously admonished the witness concerning the impropriety
of such testimony. Care was also taken to distinguish that case
from the Covington and Ambrose decisions in that in Atkins "it
App. 353, 346 S.W.2d 450 (1960); Rhoden v. Booth, 344 S.W.2d 481 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1961); Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah 2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962); Sawyer
v. Ewen, 125 Vt. 196, 212 A.2d 628 (1965).
4 99 W. Va. 431, 129 S.E. 313 (1926).
5 100 W. Va. 452, 130 S.E. 810 (1926).

6The Court was careful to recognize the general rule but reasoned that
since the statement was volunteered by the witness and unresponsive the
general rule was rendered inapplicable.
7See, e.g., Clark v. Hudson, 265 Ala. 630, 93 So. 2d 138 (1957); Peters v.
Benson, 425 P.2d 149 (Alas. 1967); Muehleback v. Mercer Mortuary & Chapel,
Inc., 93 Ariz. 60, 378 P.2d 741 (1963); Ragon v. Day, 228 Ark. 215, 306 S.W.2d
687 (1957); Lord v. Poore, 48 Del. 595, 108 A.2d 366 (1954); Douglass v.
Galvin, 130 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1961); Steinmetz v. Chambley, 90 Ga. App. 519, 83
S.E.2d 318 (1954); Barry v. Arrow Transp. Co., 83 Idaho 41, 358 P.2d 1041
(1960); Schaffer v. Dorsey, 70 Ill. App. 2d 390, 217 N.E.2d 19 (1966); Kelly v.
Hocutt, 125 Ind. App. 617, 128 N.E.2d 879 (1955); Stewart v. Hilton, 247
Iowa 988, 77 N.W.2d 637 (1956); Parnell v. Security Elevator Co., 174 Kan.
643, 258 P.2d 288 (1953) ; Dayoc v. Johnson, 427 S.W.2d 569 (Ky. 1968) ; Ostrowski v. Mockridge, 282 Minn. 265, 65 N.W.2d 185 (1954); Jackson v. Reed, 233
Miss. 280, 102 So. 2d 342 (1958); Beckett v. Kripe, 369 S.W.2d 258 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1963); Segebart v. Gregory, 160 Neb. 64, 69 N.W.2d 315 (1955); Sleeper
v. World of Mirth Show, Inc., 100 N.H. 158, 121 A,21 799 (1956); Runnacles
v. Doddrell, 59 N.J. Super. 363, 157 A.2d 836 (1960); Halstead v. Sansky, 48
Misc. 2d 586, 265 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1960) ; Anderson v. Schreiner, 94 N.W.
2d 294 (N.D. 1959); Oney v. Needham, 10 Ohio App. 2d 15, 225 N.E.2d 280
(1966); John W. Simmons Trucking Co. v. Briscoe, 373 P.2d 49 (Okla. 1962);
Richardson v. Wilkes-Barre Transit Corp., 172 Pa. Super. 636, 95 A.2d 365
(1963); Norton v. Ewaskio, 241 S.C. 557, 129 S.E.2d 517 (1963); Scheutzle v.
Nash-Finch Co., 72 S.D. 588, 38 N.W.2d 137 (1949); Texas & New Orleans R.R.
v. Flowers, 336 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Robinson v. Hreinson, 177
Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121 (1965); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Futrell,
209 Va. 266, 163 S.E.2d 181 (1968); Lyster v. Metzer, 68 Wash. 2d 216, 412
P.2d 340 (1966); Marken v. Empire Drilling Co., 293 P.2d 406 (Wyo. 1956).
8 101 W. Va. 263, 132 S.E. 885 (1926).
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was the plaintiff himself, and not a third party, that brought the
question of insurance into the case...
The case of Moorefield v. Lewiss may have further qualified
the West Virginia rule. The facts showed that after the jury had
been selected and sworn, counsel for the plaintiff, in the course
of an opening statement to the jury, said, "I might say that the
defendant, Mr. Lewis, has insurance.""' A more flagrant infraction
would be difficult to find. On objection by the defendant, the
trial court ruled that the statement was improper and not subject to jury consideration. The defendant moved to discharge the
jury because of the remark but his motion was overruled. On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed a
judgment for the plaintiff. It was conceded that "[t]he trial court
should have sustained the motion to discharge the jury because
of counsel's effort to inject into the trial a matter so plainly erroneous and highly prejudicial."' 12 Even so, it was felt that reversal
was not warranted since the lower court had acted promptly with
regard to the adverse statement. The court emphasized that "a
plain case for recovery [had] been established by the whole
evidence." 3 On the other hand, there continues to be ample authority in West Virginia supporting the proposition that in certain
instances even a trial court's attempted remedial instruction will
not suffice to eradicate a prejudicial statement from the purview
of the jury.14 In fact, our court has held that an instruction will
at times serve no function other than to impress more strongly
upon the minds of the jury that insurance is involved in the
litigation. 5
The 1932 decision of Oldfield v. Woodall' 6 determined that
it was ordinarily proper to allow counsel for the plaintiff to ask
9 Id. at 267, 132 S.E. at 887 (emphasis added).
10 96 W. Va. 112, 123 S.E. 564 (1924).
11Id. at 115, 123 S.E. at 565.
12 Id. at 116, 123 S.E. at 565.
'13 Id.
'4 Wilkens v. Schwartz, 101 W. Va. 263, 132 S.E. 885
(1926); Christie v.
Mitchell, 93 W. Va. 200, 116 S.E. 715 (1923).
15 Leftwich v. Wesco Corp., 146 W. Va. 196, 119 S.E2d 401 (1961).
16 113 W. Va. 35, 166 S.E. 691 (1932). The following testimony was elicited from defendant's witness on cross-examination: "Q. What is your business,
Mr. Evans? Objection; overruled as going to the credibility of the witness, and
for no other purpose. Exception. A. What is my business? Q. Yes, sir. A. I
am in the automobile body works business. Q. Is that your main business?
A. Yes, it is. Q. What other business have you besides that? A. I don't have
any. Q. What was your business at the time of this accident and a short time
thereafter? A. I was in the insurance business. Q. You were an insurance
adjuster, were you not? A. No, sir, I never have been. I have been an insurance agent but no adjuster." Id. at 88, 166 S... at 698.
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the defendant's witness whether or not he was an insurance adjuster. This question, which concerned the credibility of the witness, was permitted because the court was cognizant of the fact that
"an adjuster might unwittingly be prejudiced against a plaintiff
in such a case." 17 It should be emphasized that the legitimate interpretation afforded to such testimony went solely to the credibility
of the witness. The good faith intent of such an inquiry could not
be designed nor could it be used to disclose defendant's insurance
coverage indirectly.
The case of Butcher v. Stull,8 suggests an extension of the
Oldfield principle. In Butcher, the plaintiff sought damages for
personal injuries sustained in an automobile collision. A witness
for the defendant gave testimony which was markedly contradictory
to the plaintiff's evidence. Questioning by defendant's counsel
created the impression that the witness was totally disinterested.
However, on cross-examination the witness was constrained to
reveal that he was an insurance adjuster employed by the defendant's insurer, and that he went to the scene of the collision at the
direction of the defendants. 19 The trial court then promptly instructed the jury that the previous line of questioning could be
considered solely for the purpose of determining whether the
witness had any interest in the outcome of the case. The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the jury verdict for

the plaintiff and said:
This Court is firmly committed to the rule that a

plaintiff in a personal injury or wrongful death case may
not . . . improperly inform the jury of the fact that the
defendant is protected by indemnity insurance. Thus, a
shield has been provided for the protection of insurance
I Id. at 40, 116 S.E. at 693.
28 140 W. Va. 31, 82 S.E.2d 278 (1954), commented on, 57 W. Va. L. Rev.

104 (1955).

The following testimony was elicited on cross-examination:
"Q. Mr. Haggerty, by whom are employed? A. I am employed by Haggerty Insurance Service. Q. And what is your position with
Haggerty Insurance Service? A. I am an insurance adjustor. Q. On
whose behalf were you summoned to this court to testify? A. Mr.
Stull's. Q. At whose direction did you go to the scene of the accident.
A. With Mr. Stull. Q. At whose request did you go to the scene of
the accident? A. That was my own idea. I mean that is part of the
investigation. Q. You work independently, then, on these investigations? A. That's right. Q. What interest did you have in Investigating this accident? A. That was my job, to investigate accidents. Q.
Your job was to investigate accidents, and you were employed to do so
by the Haggerty Insurance Agency; is that right? A. Haggerty Insurance Service, yes, that's right. Q. What interest do they have in this
19

case? A. They, of course, nsure Mr. Stult" Id. at 40, 82 S.Z.2d at 284.
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companies. However, this shield must not be converted
into an offensive weapon to be used for a purpose not contemplated by the rule. The unpleasant situation in which
the insurance company found itself was not created by the
plaintiff, her counsel, or witnesses. When [the witness]
was placed upon the . . .stand by the defendant, under
the circumstances revealed by the record, and in view of
the admonition given to the jury by the trial court, it was
not improper for the plaintiff to ask the questions.., and
to receive the answers made . ..so that the jury might
consider that information in determining the [witness']
interest in the case, or bias in favor of the defendants in
weighing his testimony.20
The principal of the Butcher case comes within a well recognized exception to the general rule and permits facts which tend to
show interest or bias on the part of a witness to be elicited on
cross-examination, even though such examination may necessarily
disclose that the defendant is protected by insurance. 21 One rationale for this exception is that "[n] o witness, offered by either side,
be he prince, potentate, physician, judge or private citizen is ex2
empt from the right of fair cross-examination."'
However, the recent holding in Ellison v. Wood & Bush Co.
has left some uncertainty about the Butcher exception. In Ellison
the plaintiff homeowner had instituted a suit against the defendant highway contractor to recover for damages allegedly caused
to her dwelling by concussions resulting from the defendant's
blasting operations. At the trial the defendant introduced a witness who testified that he had inspected the plaintiff's property
before and after the blasting operations. His testimony indicated
considerably less damage to the property than was described by
the plaintiff and her witnesses. During cross-examination this witness was compelled to relate that he had been hired by the de-

fendant's insurer for the purpose of making "pre-blast" inspections. 24 The Circuit Court of Cabell County entered a judgment
on jury verdict for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed.
at 48, 82 S.E.2d at 288 (emphasis added).
21 See Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761 (1949); 2 J. WIGMORa,
ed. 1940).
20 Id.

EVIDENCE

§ 282 (a) (3rd

22 Mississippi Ice & Utilities Co. v. Pearce, 161 Miss. 252, 264, 134 So. 164,

167 (1931).
2 170 S.E.2d 321 (W. Va. 1969).
24 The following testimony was deemed crudal when the case was reviewed on appeal:
'Q. So no walks are figured because you couldn't see any difference. Then why did you put these other things in if you couldn't see

any difference?
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The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed and awarded the defendant a new trial holding that the defendant's motion
for a mistrial should have been granted by the lower court because
the element of insurance had been improperly injected into the
case.
The Butcher and Ellison cases had similar factual patterns.
The differences in result are complicated by the fact that the
Butcher principle is not referred to in the Ellison holding. Nevertheless, a careful study of the facts and circumstances of each case
may assist in clarifying their distinctions.
The court in Ellison appeared to stress the fact that the witness gave no overt indication that he was biased or hostile, "other
than the mere fact that his testimony differed materially from that
of the plaintiff and her witnesses."2 5 In Butcher the court noted
that the witness appeared totally "disinterested" and there was no
manifest indication that the witness was hostile or biased. The
Butcher holding affirmed the propriety of revealing possible "hidden bias" or interest of a witness.
The witness in the Butcher case was an "insurance adjuster"
whereas the witness in Ellison would perhaps be called a "preblast inspector." There might be some difference in the occupational descriptions, but both apparently perform similar duties.
Their investigations are conducted for the purpose of ascertaining
possible damage and subsequent liability.
The court in Ellison seemed to place substantial weight on the
fact the previous testimony of the witness had made it evident that
neither plaintiff nor defendant had requested his presence at the
blasting area. Furthermore, it was shown that counsel for plaintiff
had in his possession a copy of the witness inspection report. This
report was prepared for the insurance company. These facts are
probably mentioned to charge plaintiff's counsel with actual knowledge of the witness employer, and therefore extinguish all motive
for extracting the prejudicial testimony except that of calculated
design. In Butcher, however, counsel did have knowledge, direct
A. Because I was asked to., Q. By whom? Mr. Schaub [defendant's
counsel]:
It was at my request. Q. Just a minute. By whom? A. (Pause). The
Court: Who asked you? A. Can I say that, sir? The Court: Yes, answer
A. Can I ask you a question? The Court: No, don't ask me any question. Answer the question and answer promptly, who told you to do
that. A. The Travelers Insurance Company. But I thought you weren't
supposed to say that. Is that all right? The Court: All right." Id. at
30.
25 Id. at 351.
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